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The crisis 
of capitalism and 
international 
Raúl Prebisch 
Full understanding of the nature of the present crisis 
calls for an interpretation which is at once broad 
enough to cover both the centres and the periphery 
and deep enough to penetrate beyond the superficial 
manifestations of the problem to the very heart of its 
causes. 
In his search for such an interpretation, the au-
thor begins by analysing the internal structural imbal-
ance of the centres, which consists, ultimately,| of the 
disparity between the growth rate of consumption 
(both private and social, civil and military) and that of 
the accumulation of reproductive capital. This dis-
parity lies at the root of inflation and of the fiscal def-
icit, which help to complicate the situation just as do 
the monetarist-type measures with which it is sought 
to combat them. 
The author then goes on to deal with the struc-
tural imbalance between the periphery and the 
centres, in respect to which he examines the persis-
tent problems of trade relations between them, and 
the conjunctural incidence of the crisis on the 
peripheral countries, in which connection he analyses 
the main short-term problems facing the countries of 
Latin America and the policy measures which should 
be used to tackle them, centered around the idea of 
reactivation. In the final chapter, on market laws and 
ideologies, he stresses the importance currently as-
sumed by the ideological crisis, the complex manner 
in which it mingles with the other aspects of the crisis, 
and the need to overcome the state of intellectual de-
pendence in which the periphery has lived in recent 
years. 
•Document submitted to the Secretary-Genera I of 
UNCTAD. 
"Director, CEPAL Review. 
I 
The internal structural 
imbalance of the 
centres 
1. The crisis of the system and the crisis of ideas 
We are witnessing the end of an historic stage in 
the evolution of capitalism. After an enormous 
accumulation of capital over a prolonged period' 
of time, and after having reached impressive 
levels of productivity, the latter is flagging and 
depression and unemployment are advancing 
upon us, with serious wastage of productive re-
sources all over the world. 
It is not a question of the final decadence 
of a system of enormous growth potential, since 
the vital elements which gave it great force per-
sist, and the source of the incessant technologi-
cal innovations is far from having dried up. It 
must be acknowledged, however, that the sys-
tem is in crisis: it has strayed from its path and 
is suffering from structural imbalances which 
cannot be dealt with by ideas and forms of ac-
tion that have been overtaken by events. The 
evolution of technology has brought with it great 
changes in the structure of society which have 
been matched by great changes in the structure 
of power, and no one is as yet certain how to 
deal with them. It is a crisis of the system and 
also a crisis of ideas, which have lagged behind 
the course of events. 
All this is reflected in the disturbances in 
international trade and the persistent inflation, 
while the crisis has also acquired an institutional 
nature; GATT is crumbling, and monetary in-
struments have become ineffective and nega-
tive. 
2. The frustrations of G ATT 
The concept behind the founding of GATT was 
based essentially on the free play of the market 
forces at the international level, but although it 
is true that GATT has had great importance for 
the centres, it is now on the verge of a serious 
setback. The recent meeting has been quite dis-
concerting: after the Kennedy and Tokyo 
rounds, where the great liberalization of the 
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centres' trade had been achieved, it might have 
been expected that GATT would be given its 
definitive consolidation. In fact, however, no 
undertakings whatever have been entered into 
to combat the drift back towards protectionism. 
Furthermore, while it is true that low tariffs have 
been maintained, various non-tariff restrictions 
have been growing u p which seriously prejudice 
the liberalization achieved after such tenacious 
efforts. 
These restrictions recall those of past 
times, which were not of course the result of ar-
bitrary, irresponsible actions which spread over 
the whole world, but were imposed by the seri-
ous events set off by the great world depression. 
Just as is happening today, the epicentre of 
this phenomenon was located in the United 
States, where the violent restriction of credit 
and the abrupt increase in customs duties did 
away with the multilateral system of trade and 
payments in a very short time. It took many 
years to restore this system, and GATT bore the 
important responsibility of gradually disen-
tangling the mass of different protectionist 
measures and avoiding any subsequent backslid-
ing: a responsibility which it has largely fulfilled. 
It would seem, however, that GATT is los-
ing its effectiveness for the centres, thus ex-
plaining the recent frustration at Geneva. How 
is this fact to be explained? 
In a few words, it may be said that this in-
stitution has not been able to do something 
which it was in any case unreasonable to expect 
it to accomplish alone, for its effectiveness de-
pends fundamentally on the expansion of the 
world economy. This is at present suffering a 
serious recession which is turning into a depres-
sion, however, and the spread of unemploy-
ment makes it increasingly difficult to struggle 
against the growing temptation of each country 
to defend itself from imports and from the con-
sequences of monetary instability. Restrictions 
on one side provoke similar action on the other, 
and in this way the crisis is continually aggra-
vated. 
There can be no question of finding magic 
spells against this evil: the most that could be 
achieved through GATT is some degree of con-
tainment of these measures, for the problem is 
really quite different. It is necessary to go to its 
very roots, and these are once again to be found 
in the United States, whence the economic re-
cession set off by the anti-inflation policy is 
spreading to the other centres and to the rest of 
the world, with very serious consequences. 
The effectiveness which GATT had for 
the centres did not extend to the periphery, 
since the original conception behind its estab-
lishment was in line with the interests of the 
former and did not allow for the systematic in-
dustrialization of the latter, although this initial 
attitude was subsequently adjusted to some ex-
tent. Industrialization took place as a result of 
the crisis of the centres (the two world wars and 
the great depression which occurred between 
them). 
3. The periphery and trade liberalization 
The periphery has been kept on the sidelines of 
the liberalization which took place among the 
centres, just as it had been kept on the sidelines 
of industrialization. In spite of determined ef-
forts, it has not proved possible to secure any 
substantial liberalization of the attitude of the 
central countries to imports from the develop-
ing countries, even during the years of great 
prosperity of the former. 
On the contrary, the developed countries 
maintained or even accentuated their restrictive 
measures during the period of prosperity which 
camé to an end in the first half of the 1970s. 
Thus, the export successes of some developing 
countries were due primarily to the overall 
growth in demand, rather than to the elimina-
tion of restrictions. Be that as it may, the indus-
trialization of the periphery is now causing seri-
ous problems for GATT. The centres had pre-
viously proclaimed the advantages of the inter-
national division of labour, when the periphery 
was not in a position to enjoy them as regards 
manufacture because it did not possess indus-
tries. Now, however, when the periphery does 
have industries, the centres are striving to find 
ways of refusing to recognize these advantages 
and are resorting to all kinds of restrictions out-
side the framework of the principles which gave 
rise to GATT: instead of the free play of the 
market forces, we now have 'managed trade', to 
use the very fitting expression coined by the 
UNCTAD secretariat. What was previously in 
keeping with the clear interests of the centres 
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now seems to have ceased to be so in view of the 
changes which have taken place, thanks to the 
spread of technology, in the structure of pro-
duction of the peripheral countries. 
The expansion of the world economy in 
the years after the Second World War created 
suitable conditions in the centres for the liberali-
zation of their trade. There was a marked ten-
dency in them towards homogeneity of produc-
tion techniques, as the technical innovations of 
the United States spread to countries which had 
previously lagged behind and stimulated in 
them their own innovations. The transnational 
corporations played a very important role in this 
process. This was both a consequence and at the 
same time a contributing factor of the sustained 
growth in world demand and trade between the 
centres. And this trade was increasingly stimu-
lated by the successive technological innova-
tions. No matter how much the peripheral 
countries had progressed with their industriali-
zation, they were still of course far from the 
stage at which they could participate actively in 
this movement. At the same time, however, they 
were increasingly developing the capacity to ex-
port manufactures, in some cases to an impres-
sive extent. The manufactures involved con-
sisted above all of goods which were either tech-
nologically less advanced or were produced by 
processes which had already ceased to be novel 
in the centres. 
The great problem these manufactures 
have raised has been the need for a progressive 
reduction of the restrictions which do so much 
harm to the development of the periphery. 
There is no sign, however, that this is likely to 
occur in the present circumstances: on the con-
trary, serious setbacks are to be observed in this 
respect. Indeed, the talk is once again of reci-
procity: that is to say, in order to secure the re-
duction of such restrictions on the part of the 
centres, the peripheral countries would have to 
make matching concessions. This simply means 
ignoring the great structural differences be-
tween the centre and the periphery which are 
due to the historic lag in the industrialization of 
the latter. We shall deal with this point in the 
following section. 
4. The structural imbalance of the centres 
We referred earlier to the resurgence of protec-
tionism, and this fact must be acknowledged 
quite frankly. It will be increasingly difficult to 
combat this trend if, in order to check inflation, 
the central countries insist on a restrictive mone-
tary policy, especially through very high interest 
rates in the main dynamic centre of capitalism. 
Whichever way one looks at the matter, a reacti-
vation policy is called for, but to what extent will 
it be possible to apply such a policy without sink-
ing into a new wave of inflation? This is the dis-
turbing question which it is impossible to avoid. 
What has happened to the capitalism of 
the centres after such a long period of expan-
sion? In order to answer this question, it is nec-
essary to explain the serious structural imbal-
ance which has occurred in those countries. 
This imbalance lies at the root of the new type of 
inflation which has appeared in this historic 
stage of capitalism. The attempt to tackle it 
through monetary policies has brought with it 
the present adverse situation which, as well as 
upsetting the trade of the centres, is making the 
external structural imbalance of the periphery 
even more pronounced. 
Let us now try to explain what this struc-
tural imbalance consists of. 
The considerable increase in productivity 
previously observed in capitalist development 
has gradually been slackening. This fact is 
closely related to the drop in the rate of accumu-
lation of reproductive capital: that is to say, capi-
I tal which multiplies employment and productiv-
ity through technical innovations and thus, in 
turn, constitutes the primary source of the 
growth of capital. This is a growth sequence 
which cannot be neglected without upsetting the 
functioning of the system. 
The accumulation of reproductive capital 
has been based mainly on the primary appropri-
ation of the fruits of growing productivity, espe-
cially by the upper strata of the social structure 
because of their economic, social and political 
power. The myth of the progressive spread of 
the fruits of technical process throughout soci-
ety thanks to the laws of the market has not 
materialized, and only a portion of these fruits 
has been transferred to that part of the labour 
force which has the ever-higher qualifications 
demanded by technical progress. The portion 
which is not transferred remains, in the form of 
the economic surplus, mainly in the hands of 
the upper strata who own most of the means of 
production. 
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This form of appropriation of the surplus 
has made possible the process of intensive ac-
cumulation observed in the past in capitalist de-
velopment. However, this process has become 
increasingly vulnerable in the course of the 
structural changes in the system and the con-
sequent changes in the power relations. 
Thus, the power of appropriation has 
been offset by growing power to force sharing 
of the fruits of productivity: on the one hand 
there has been an increase in the trade union 
and political power of the labour force, and on 
the other, in that of the State, in response both 
to this trade union and political power and to 
the demands of the growth of the State itself. 
A struggle thus takes place which has posi-
tive effects until the system nears a certain criti-
cal limit, which occurs when the labour force 
and the State take for themselves such a propor-
tion of the increase in productivity that the rate 
of appropriation begins to flag and, with it, the 
rate of reproductive accumulation. The growth 
of the system thus begins to slacken. Beyond this 
limit, the system reacts with a rise in prices, and 
this is followed by a rise in wages when the 
labour force has sufficient trade union and 
political power to achieve this. This gives rise to 
the phenomenon of spiralling inflation, which 
cannot be checked with monetary instruments 
without serious negative consequences. 
These latter instruments were of proven 
effectiveness when there was no major counter-
weight to the dominant economic and political 
power of the upper strata, but they cease to be 
effective when the power relations change. 
5. Consumption and accumulation 
In order to gain a clearer picture of these 
phenomena, the struggle to share in the fruits 
of increased productivity should be viewed from 
another angle. Appropriation of the fruits of 
technical progress by the upper strata does not 
serve only to increase accumulation, but is gen-
erally accompanied by an exaggerated increase 
in consumption. Moreover, the increase in the 
wages of the labour force tends to expand con-
sumption too as new forms of consumption 
arise in the upper strata, because of the unceas-
ing diversification of goods and services 
brought by technological^ innovations, as well as 
the increase in productivity. Social consumption 
also develops and grows, thanks to the political 
power of the labour force. This growth in both 
the private and social consumption of the labour 
force, however, does not usually take place at 
the expense of the consumption of the upper 
strata, but is superimposed on it. The same oc-
curs in the case of the growing civil and military 
expenditure of the State. 
All this reaches its most outstanding ex-
pression in the United States, where the image 
of bountiful prosperity has contributed mar-
kedly to this exuberant style of consumption. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that this con-
tinual superimposition of different forms of 
consumption, together with the growth of dif-
ferent types of non-reproductive capital, is 
weakening the rate of accumulation of repro-
ductive capital. The internal logic of the system 
thus tends towards an imbalance or maladjust-
ment between the rate of consumption and the 
rate of accumulation of reproductive capital, or, 
in other words, between consumption and the 
saving necessary in order for consumption to 
keep up its rate of expansion. 
It is easy to imagine this happening in the 
development of the periphery. What is hard to 
conceive, however, is that the internal logic of 
the system should tend towards this imbalance 
in the centres. Is it not true that the centres have 
achieved a considerable capacity for accumula-
tion? And did not Keynes sustain, fifty years or 
so ago, that the system tended rather towards an 
excess of saving? 
Whichever way we look at it, however, the 
full restoration of the growth rate of the system 
calls for the social reorganization of consump-
tion in order to raise the rate of accumulation of 
reproductive capital sufficiendy to increase em-
ployment and productivity. I do not wish to give 
the impression with this that there are not other 
adverse factors, but it does seem to me that the 
rate of accumulation of reproductive capital is 
of fundamental importance. There can be no 
doubt that successive technological innovations 
could increase the rate of productivity, but they 
also require the accumulation of capital. 
The rate of accumulation can only be 
raised by reducing the growth rate or even the 
absolute level of consumption, depending on 
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the severity of the imbalance. In reality, how-
ever, the smaller amount of consumption on the 
one hand would be offset by additional con-
sumption on the other, since the increase in the 
accumulation of reproductive capital makes it 
possible to increase employment and consump-
tion by those who had previously been without 
work because of the structural imbalance or be-
cause they belong to the underprivileged social 
strata which had not been able to incorporate 
themselves into development at rising levels of 
productivity. 
It is hardly necessary to show that changes 
of this kind in the social composition of con-
sumption would run into formidable political 
obstacles. Is there any other way of solving this 
problem, then? The market laws do not solve it, 
nor does the social struggle to share in the fruits 
of progress. What is to be done, then? 
The considerable fiscal deficit of the 
United States is an acute manifestation of struc-
tural imbalance. It has been acknowledged that 
consumption must be reduced in order to cover 
this deficit without causing inflationary effects. 
To this end, attempts are being made to attract 
savings from the public by offering extraordi-
narily high interest rates, which in turn means 
that bank interest rates on loans must be raised 
too, thus restricting credit to private activity, 
since otherwise bank money would be displaced 
towards the State, with inflationary effects. The 
depressive consequences of credit restrictions 
are well known and would be highly negative, 
^ since they would increase the deficit and di-
minish savings. Inflation could be reduced and 
possibly even eliminated through credit restric-
tions, but only at a very high social cost and, fur-
thermore, without correcting the structural fac-
tors which give rise to it. 
There has also been a good deal of discus-
sion in the United States regarding the need to 
increase supply (i.e., the product) in order to 
check this phenomenon, in contradiction to the 
manipulation of demand advocated by the 
Keynesians. Indeed, if the product could be in-
creased by greater accumulation, this would cor-
rect the structural imbalance which upsets the 
system. In order to achieve this purpose, how-
ever, it was maintained until very recently that it 
is necessary to reduce taxation on the upper 
strata so that they will accumulate more. Even if 
they actually did this instead of increasing con-
sumption which is highly problematical, this 
would not only mean promoting social inequity 
but would in its turn increase the fiscal deficit 
and its inflationary impact: that is to say, it 
would compress the consumption of the other 
social strata, and their members would try to 
make good their losses, thus accentuating the 
spiral. 
It is interesting to note that an idea put 
forward a few years ago in a report prepared by 
experts of the United States Treasury Depart-
ment now seems to have been forgotten. In this 
report, which was perhaps inspired by Lord 
Kaldor, it was advocated that there should be a 
radical modification of the tax system, whereby 
consumption would be taxed progressively in-
stead of income: thus, that part of income which 
was not consumed would remain free of tax. Ex-
pressed in other terms, this tax on consumption 
would considerably encourage saving and ac-
cumulation. It seems strange to us that this pro-
posal has not been discussed, in view of the ten-
dency to an imbalance between accumulation 
and consumption. Of course I do not believe 
that this idea would solve the whole problem, 
but it would help to solve it if it were accom-
panied by other measures. 
It must be understood, however, that 
—above all in a country accustomed to the in-
definite expansion of consumption— this idea, 
like others aimed at the same objective, would 
run into very serious obstacles. Nevertheless, the 
truth is that there have not been any other pro-
posals which really go to the root of the 
problem. 
We also keep coming back to the sugges-
tion that prices and wages should be controlled, 
but even if this had some temporary success, it 
could hardly be kept in effect for very long with-
out serious difficulties. 
T o sum up, there has not.yet been any 
clear discussion of the structural nature of the 
matter. The conventional doctrines represent a 
severe obstacle, which is as powerful as the inter-
ests which maintain it and promote it. Must we 
wait until the crisis gets worse, or until it repeats 
itself after we had had the illusion of having 
solved it, in order for new ideas and new forms 
of action to emerge? 
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6. United States inflation and 
the Eurodollar market 
We shall now make special reference to inflation 
in the United States, not only because of the 
enormous importance of this country in the 
world economy but also because in the Bretton 
Woods agreements the dollar was given the role 
of an international currency in addition to its 
national role. Those were times when the dollar 
enjoyed great prestige, and very few people 
glimpsed the peril which this decision involved. 
United States inflation goes back quite a 
long way, but it was moderate and tolerable 
until the social expenditure of President 
Johnson's 'New Society' and military spending 
gave rise to an inflationary deficit which sub-
sequently got worse with the rise in petroleum 
prices in 1974. It may be noted in passing that 
this rise was not in itself responsible for the in-
flation, which had been provoked three years 
earlier by the abandonment of convertibility, 
but there can be no doubt that it helped to ac-
centuate it. 
This domestic inflation brought with it, as 
always, an external imbalance, but it was possi-
ble to cover this with dollars, that is to say, with 
mere monetary symbols.This meant that the 
domestic inflationary pressure on the product, 
together with part of the expenditure and in-
vestments abroad, could be covered with the 
product of the rest of the world. 
If the dollar had not been playing this in-
ternational role, the inflation suffered by the 
United States after the abandonment of convert-
ibility would rapidly have resulted in devalua-
tion of the currency, but this finally took place 
only after considerable delay, having finally 
been imposed by the external imbalance. 
In the meantime, the overvaluation of the 
currency discouraged domestic investment by 
the transnational corporations, which preferred 
to make most of their investments abroad, to the 
detriment of the product of their own country. 
Thus, although the United States was able to 
enjoy the product of the rest of the world in ex-
change for dollars, this eventually adversely af-
fected its own development. 
In this way, inflation was spread to the rest 
of the world, although this does not mean that 
many countries, including those on the 
periphery, were not already suffering from the 
inflation resulting from the distributive strug-
gle. This inflation had also been developing in 
them too, but its external effects had been partly 
concealed, for the time being, through the in-
flow of US dollars. 
This inflow, moreover, gave rise to some-
thing which had not been experienced up to 
then: the creation of the Eurodollar market. 
The monetary authorities of the other central 
countries, concerned at the expansive effects of 
the increase in reserves, viewed with favour the 
disposal of these resources on the Eurodollar 
market. In this way, the domestic inflation of 
credit was avoided or reduced, but only by 
transferring it to the international level. It was 
not only transferred but also increased, because 
for every dollar which entered the market in 
this way, the recipient banks increased their own 
creation of credit several times, as occurs with 
the increase of monetary reserves at the domes-
tic level, but with the difference that within their 
own countries the monetary authorities had in-
struments for controlling this expansion of 
credit. In contrast, the Eurodollar operations 
were completely free of all regulation, and the 
consequences of this became very clear with the 
passage of time. 
In this creation of money, no regulatory 
principle was followed at all, since this increase 
in the world money supply was the consequence 
of the domestic inflation of the United States, 
rather than an attempt to meet the demands of 
world development. 
7. The laws of the market and the IMF 
This was a lamentable setback in the monetary 
progress which had taken place over so many 
years. Long experience had established certain 
rules of domestic regulation deriving from the 
gold standard, and it had long been recognized 
that although the profit motive was important, 
it could not be allowed to determine the degree 
of expansion of credit without serious inflation-
ary consequences. The dual role of the dollar 
enabled it to divorce itself completely from 
these regulatory principles in the Eurodollar 
-market, where the desire of the great interna-
tional banks for profits led to the creation of ad-
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ditional Eurodollars, thus intensifying the origi-
nal inflation. 
The International Monetary Fund could 
have played a regulatory role, in view of the fact 
that ít is not a profit-making institution, but no 
provision had been made for such a situation. In 
any case, it could hardly have done much, both 
because of the pressure of the banking groups 
in the centres and that of the debtor countries, 
which were able in this way to avoid the strict 
conditions of the IMF, whose attitude was 
marked by a singular degree of technocratic au-
thoritarianism. 
As we said earlier, one of the important 
conclusions deriving from long experience was 
that the creation of money could not be left to 
the dictates of the profit motive, since this would 
inevitably end in the abuse of credit and infla-
tion, but this experience was not taken into ac-
count in the Eurodollar market, and even now, 
after such adverse results, many circles continue 
to insist on the prime role of the private interna-
tional banks. In their view, the role of the IMF 
should only be to make loans at the last moment 
to avoid a serious international financial stam-
pede. It should refrain from interfering in the 
free play of the market laws, only to intervene at 
the last moment in rescue operations! 
At all events, I feel, the IMF should also 
make use of its own experience in order to play 
a leading role in the international monetary re-
form. Could this reform possibly be placed on a 
solid basis without changing the process of ap-
propriation, accumulation and distribution in 
order to correct its growing vulnerability? I do 
not think so for one moment, for reasons which 
it is not necessary to repeat again here. 
A clarification is called for at this point, 
however, even if only in passing. On more than 
one occasion, when I referred to the imbalance 
between consumption and the accumulation of 
reproductive capital, my opponents argued that 
the Eurodollar market represented a plentiful 
source of capital, but the fact is that this attitude 
represents a serious confusion of genuine capi-
tal with inflationary capital. The international 
loans represented genuine capital to the extent 
that those who received dollars in payment for 
exports refrained from consuming and instead 
made loans, but they did not represent such 
genuine capital when these loans were made 
through the creation of additional credits in dol-
lars in this singular market. 
I do not mean to say by this that the 
Eurocurrency market has not been very useful 
to the extent that it has enabled certain coun-
tries to cover their purchases of petroleum with 
such credits without sacrificing other imports, at 
a time when they were not able to increase their 
exports. It is necessary to draw a distinction, 
however, between this situation and the easy 
and plentiful credit to which many countries re-
sorted (especially in the case of Latin America) 
because of the extreme liberality of the banks 
operating in this market. 
Looking back at events from a distance, it 
might have been assumed that the IMF and the 
World Bank would have played a very active 
role, especially in order to ensure that the finan-
cial surpluses from oil were used for genuine 
capital loans, avoiding the inflationary expan-
sion of credit like that which occurred in the 
Eurodollar market. 
The Fund could have contained these la-
mentable excesses by promoting the judicious 
use of the resources available on reasonable 
terms. This was to some extent prevented, how-
ever, by the conditions which this institution has 
set itself: conditions which —as far as I can re-
member— were never discussed with the de-
veloping countries. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that the countries wishing to obtain these re-
sources saw an opportunity to get around these 
conditions by making use of the loans provided 
so liberally by the international private banking 
system. The latter, for its part, seems to have 
been guided by the incentive of making juicy 
profits rather than by the necessary sense of 
prudence and foresight. 
In the light of past experience, the spread-
ing concern about the reform of the interna-
tional monetary system is perfectly understand-
able: I think such reform has to come and that 
the developing countries should be preparing 
themselves for taking part in its formulation. 
The starting point should be the creation 
of a true international currency instead of the 
dollar. The Bretton Woods agreements gave the 
United States the privilege of providing cur-
rency for international transactions: that is to 
say, the privilege of seigniorage and also the re-
sponsibility for it. In the creation of an interna-
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tional currency the responsibility should be col-
lective and not given to a single country or a 
very small group of countries of great influence: 
it should be extended to all, so that it would thus 
cease to be a privilege. 
Of course there are considerable obstacles 
to this, not only as regards the substitution of 
the dollar, for obvious reasons, but also because 
the proper functioning of a new system would 
demand the solution of the problem of the huge 
mass of dollars floating in the Eurodollar mar-
ket. This would be a very difficult operation, not 
only because of what it signifies in itself, but also 
because these dollars represent a large debt on 
the part of the United States, on which that 
country does not pay interest. 
Beyond all this, there is another consider-
ation of fundamental importance. Could a new 
system function properly while the countries in 
the world which will carry most weight in its op-
eration are unable to correct their own infla-
tionary processes? Rising prices will call for the 
continual expansion of the international money 
supply, and these countries could agree among 
themselves to do so, even though this would 
heighten international inflation. In contrast 
1. The centres and the periphery 
The centres have always stubbornly refused to 
recognize their great structural differences 
from the periphery, which stem from the con-
siderable lag in the latter's development. This 
lag is itself the consequence of the inherent dy-
namics of advanced capitalism: a centripetal 
type of dynamics which has always characterized 
the latter's development in the past and has not 
spread spontaneously to the rest of the world. 
T h e fruits of the increase in productivity due to 
their enormous technological progress have re-
mained in the centres and have not spread 
further through the reduction of prices: a situa-
tion which has given great impetus to the ac-
with what happened in a system based on the 
gold standard, where the loss of monetary re-
sources tended to limit domestic monetary ex-
pansion, the deliberate creation of international 
currency would instead be the obvious 'solution* 
for bringing relief at the international level to 
important countries which had not been able to 
contain their domestic inflation. 
It may be concluded from this that a good 
international monetary system could hardly 
function properly if these countries failed to 
tackle to the full their problems of structural in-
flation. If this were not done, then instead of the 
creation of dollars by the United States we 
would have the creation of international cur-
rency through the influence of countries inter-
ested in dealing with the external effects of their 
own inflation which they had not been able to 
contain. 
A good international monetary system 
must be based on the transformation of the 
domestic process of appropriation, accumula-
tion of reproductive capital and redistribution 
of income: consequently, a great deal must be 
done and renewed before this goal is reached.1 
'These comments recall to me a significant episode 
which occurred in the early days of UNCTAD. A committee 
of independent experts recommended that a link should be 
established between the creation of Special Drawing Rights 
and the provision of financial co-operation to the developing 
countries. It was claimed at that time —in opposition to this 
idea— that the pressure of the latter countries would involve 
the risk of provoking international inflation. Finally, the link 
was not approved, but even so there was inflationary expan-
sion of the dollar at the international level. 
In this way, a very important opportunity to co-oper-
ate in the development of the periphery, subject to all the 
safeguards that seemed necessary, was thrown away. This 
shows once again that generally speaking the centres are not 
interested in the development of the periphery except to the 
extent that this serves their own interests. 
II 
The structural imbalance between the periphery 
and the centres 
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cumulation of reproductive capital and the un-
ceasing innovations of the centre. For better or 
for worse, this is how the capitalism of the 
centres has developed, with the periphery play-
ing only the role of an appendix. This explains 
the historical lag in the latter's development and 
its great structural differences with the centres, 
which are manifested in three main points 
worth mentioning briefly here: the structural 
disparities in demand; the economic and tech-
nological inferiority of the periphery, which 
makes protection necessary; and the character-
istic division of the periphery into relatively 
small units, which calls for integration mea-
sures. 
2. Structural disparities in demand 
With regard to the first point, in order for a 
country on the periphery to develop it is essen-
tial for it to change Us structure of production in 
order to cope with the correlative changes in de-
mand. 
These changes can be oriented mainly to-
wards the interior or towards the outside world, 
and the attitude of the centres has a dominant 
influence in this. There can be inward-oriented 
changes involving. import substitution, or out-
ward-oriented changes involving the export of 
manufactures. The latter option has become in-
creasingly necessary because of the relative 
slowness with which exports of primary com-
modities generally tend to grow. 
The increasing obstacles standing in the 
way ofimport substitution beyond certain limits 
are well known. The limits in question depend 
on the availability of natural resources and on 
technological considerations, thus making it 
necessary to combine import substitution with 
the export of manufactures. 
T o what extent can manufactures be ex-
ported? Over and above the question of the ef-
fort that a peripheral country is willing to make 
in this direction, this extent depends funda-
mentally on the receptiveness of the centres, 
which is influenced in turn by their rate of de-
velopment and the intensity of their restrictions 
on imports from the periphery. As a general 
rule, it could be said that the greater the recep-
tiveness of the centres in the light of these two 
elements, the less need there will be to substitute 
imports on the periphery. 
This, however, covers only one aspect of 
the matter; the other aspect concerns the 
changes in the composition of demand, which, 
as noted earlier, go hand in hand with develop-
ment. In view of the well-known disparities in 
the income-elasticity of the demand for im-
ports, the demand for the latter, which come 
primarily from the centres, will tend to grow 
more quickly than the demand for the exports 
of the periphery. Such is the effect of the tech-
nological innovations of the centres, which in-
creasingly diversify goods and services, in con-
trast with the technological lag of the periphery. 
In order for the development of the latter to 
progress, it is essential that it should develop its 
exports of manufactures in order thus to correct 
the tendency towards an external structural im-
balance caused by this disparity in elasticities. If 
it does not manage to do this, it will be forced to 
engage in import substitution, in view of the 
rate of development which is proposed to 
achieve. 
3. Import substitution and protection 
Now, import substitution calls for a certain 
amount of rational and moderate protection. 
And this is where we encounter a severe obstacle 
in the form of reciprocity, which is now being 
put forward once again as a condition for the 
centres to lower their levels of protection. It is 
worth going more deeply into this matter. 
There is a fundamental difference which 
should not be overlooked: protection on the 
periphery is aimed at eliminating the tendency 
towards structural imbalance, whereas the pro-
tection of the centres tends to aggravate this ten-
•dency, to the detriment of peripheral develop-
ment. 
We have set forth our reasoning on this 
matter many times, but apparently we have not 
been persuasive enough. Reciprocity has been 
the most important reason why attempts have 
been made and continue to be made to extend 
the scope of GATT to the peripheral countries, 
so that they can participate in the negotiations 
based on this concept. It is not recognized that 
there is in fact already implicit reciprocity, since 
the more the developing countries export to the 
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centres, the more they will be able to import 
from the latter. 
There is also another consideration which 
is often forgotten. No rational projection puts 
imports below the amount that is exported to 
the centres, taking account of financial remit-
tances and other payments abroad: all that is 
changed is their composition. The difference is 
that through protection it is aimed to bring 
about a deliberate change in the composition of 
imports in order to promote change in the 
structure of production in line with the require-
ments of development. In the absence of such a 
policy, the composition of imports is deter-
mined by the international market forces and 
the transnational corporations which predomi-
nate in them, so that the structure of production 
is determined from the exterior, and this means 
that a country cannot develop faster than is per-
mitted by the growth of its exports: that is to say, 
by the receptiveness of the centres. 
Is protection really necessary in order to 
achieve these changes in the structure of pro-
duction, however? T h e original concepts under 
which GATT was set up, based on the old 
fashioned scheme of the international division 
of labour, did not accept this, nor do the 
economists who still continue to preach the vir-
tues of the free play of the market forces for the 
periphery. It is true that these economists rec-
ommend devaluation of the currency to carry 
out these changes without breaking these laws, 
but in order to simplify the argument, let us 
pass over the fact that devaluation is also a kind 
of intervention. We are not talking, of course, 
about devaluation to bring the external value of 
a currency in line with domestic inflation which 
is fully justified, but are referring to it as an 
economic policy expedient. 
Applied with this criterion, devaluation 
has the virtue of making imports more expen-
sive and thus promoting their substitution, and 
also stimulating the growth of exports through a 
reduction in their prices. It does this, of course, 
for the exports which require this stimulus, but 
it also affects the exports which were already 
competitive at the international level: that is to 
say, from their point of view, this type of change 
in the structure of production brings about a de-
terioration in the terms of trade when the 
growth of exports goes beyond certain limits: in 
other words, it would be counterproductive 
from the point of view of development. It is true 
that a tax on exports is also advocated in order 
to avoid this, but would not this represent inter-
ference by the State with the market laws? 
Furthermore, devaluation means altering 
all prices and costs in order to achieve effects on 
only a relatively small part of the global product 
of the economy. This is not all, however. It is 
well known that when the labour force has suffi-
cient power to gain compensation for price rises 
it will demand a rise in wages, which will eventu-
ally wipe out the effects of the devaluation. Con-
sequently, while protection and the correspond-
ing subsidies seem to us to be inevitable, they 
must be rational and not arbitrary or excessive, 
as often happens. 
In order to oppose the idea of protection, 
the old argument continues to be put forward 
that it is necessary to pay more for import sub-
stitution products than imports would cost. This 
reasoning fails to take account of two points of 
decisive importance, however. 
First of all, there is the low income-elastic-
ity of exports. If their volume is increased, their 
prices will go down, and after a certain point the 
periphery would suffer the phenomenon of a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, thus suffer-
ing heavier losses than the higher cost involved 
in the protection of import substitution ac-
tivities. 
Secondly, these activities make it possible, 
within certain limits, to achieve a higher growth 
rate of the global product which more than out-
weighs the higher cost involved. Protection is 
thus an economically sound solution, provided 
it is applied in a rational manner, as it is always 
necessary to insist. 
Of course it is quite true that protection on 
the part of the periphery has infringed from the 
very beginning the free play of the international 
market forces on which the original concept of 
GATT was based. 
4. Protection in the centres 
All the foregoing concerns the periphery, but it 
would seem that the most difficult problems lie 
with the centres. It is hardly surprising that 
these should resort to restrictions outside the 
ambit of GATT when they are suffering from 
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serious unemployment. As already noted, how-
ever, they were very reluctant to liberalize their 
trade even during the years of prolonged pros-
perity and even in the case of countries suffer-
ing from a shortage of labour which threw wide 
their doors to immigrants. Nothing seems to in-
dicate as yet that in the future, even when the 
current difficulties are overcome, the centres 
will be willing to make any really significant 
changes in their attitude. I think that this is a 
fundamental problem whose true significance 
has not been made fully clear. Yet it is essential 
that this should be done if we are to find solu-
tions capable of reconciling the interests of the 
centres and the periphery in increasing growth. 
It is therefore worth going into more detail on 
this subject. 
As already noted, in the past development 
of the centres the fabulous increase in produc-
tivity has not been reflected in a steady decline 
in prices, but has been retained internally. This 
is a structural phenomenon which has consti-
tuted a very important factor in the accumula-
tion of capital and in the technological innova-
tions made. The periphery has only participated 
to a marginal extent in this process, except in-
sofar as it produced raw materials which the 
centres needed. It is doubtful whether capital-
ism would have been able to develop so vigor-
ously if it had not been for this form of reten-
tion of the fruits of technical progress, especially 
in the upper strata. 
T h e industrialization of the periphery was 
not a spontaneous consequence of this capitalist 
expansion, for the centres were only interested 
in investing in the periphery in order to obtain 
from it the primary commodities they needed: 
they had no intention of establishing industries 
there which could export anything other than 
primary products. For a number of reasons, 
they preferred to carry on industrial production 
in their own part of the world, and consequently 
the industrialization of the periphery was the re-
sult of its own decision in response to the severe 
crises in the centres already referred to: two 
great World Wars and a Great Depression be-
tween them. 
Be that as it may, the periphery, which had 
first been forced to industrialize through import 
substitution because of these critical conditions 
in the centres, gradually learnt afterwards to ex-
port manufactures, thanks to the prosperity 
reigning in the centres, and through the use of 
deliberate promotional measures. If this pros-
perity were to return in a few years, although 
not necessarily at the same level as before, the 
question would arise of whether the centres 
would be willing to follow a liberalization policy 
such as they have put into effect among them-
selves. Let us examine this very important as-
pect for a moment. 
Up to now, the exports of manufactures of 
the periphery have been carried out by a few 
countries only and have accounted for a rela-
tively small part of its potential. Would the 
centres be willing to liberalize their imports if 
this export effort reached large dimensions? 
Let us reflect on the following fact. If suc-
cess was achieved in the export of manufac-
tures, this was because the exporting countries 
were capable of adopting similar techniques to 
those of the centres (although corresponding to 
less advanced phases of the latter's develop-
ment), to produce goods for which the demand 
tends to grow less rapidly than the demand for 
the increasingly technologically advanced goods 
coming from the innovations made in the 
centres. 
It is hardly surprising, that the possibility 
of access to less advanced technologies and the 
lower level of wages have enabled the exporting 
countries to compete successfully with similar 
goods produced in the centres. 
This fact could signify the beginning of a 
process of reversal of what has been occurring 
in the past in the development of the centres. It 
should be recalled that the fruits of technical 
progress have not been reflected in a corres-
ponding reduction in prices, and that generally 
speaking the ability of the centres to open up ex-
ternal markets has not been due so much, to 
lower prices as to the unceasing diversification 
of goods deriving from their technological inno-
vations. It would appear, however, that this is 
not the way in which the exports of the 
periphery have been competing in the centres: 
instead, they have been exploiting their lower 
prices. 
Although this reaction of the periphery to 
this historical process has still not reached suffi-
cient amplitude, in view of the growing export 
possibilities it is necessary to think seriously 
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about the possible consequences of the accentu-
ation of this phenomenon which has now 
begun. What will the centres do in the face of 
this process? Will they continue to maintain and 
increase their restrictions, as they have been 
doing so far outside GATT? Or will they resort 
to the use of devaluation as an instrument, as 
the periphery has been recommended to do so 
many times? 
As well as containing imports, devaluation 
would reduce the external prices of exports 
even when these were already fully competitive. 
The reason we mention this is not because we 
believe that it is likely to occur, but merely in 
order to emphasize the difficult choice which 
the centres have to face. On the one hand, they 
would continue to violate the principles of 
GATT which they have defended so much, 
while on the other they would have to resign 
themselves to losing, through the lower prices of 
their exports, part of the fruits of their technical 
progress, with all the great disturbances that 
that would imply. 
5. The international division of labour 
In the meantime, a comment is called for which 
is not without importance. The centres have al-
ways proclaimed to the periphery the advan-
tages of the international division of labour 
within the system of market laws. This attitude 
was completely in line with their interests, al-
though it prejudiced the development of the 
periphery, but now that the periphery has 
begun to export, the centres are departing from 
those principles on which the existence of 
GATT is based. 
T o tell the truth, those principles, al-
though they continue to be of great validity in 
the centres, in spite of the conjunctural 
phenomena mentioned elsewhere, have not 
been in keeping with the requirements of 
peripheral development in the past, and at 
present they actually militate against such de-
velopment because they outlaw protection. 
On the other hand, it cannot be denied 
that the centres would be exposed to growing 
upheavals if, in this new stage of industrializa-
tion of the periphery, those principles con-
tinued to be fully valid. Let us recall the nature 
of the accumulation process, whose source lies 
in the increase in productivity which is not 
passed on in the form of reduced prices but is 
reflected in the displacement of demand to in-
creasingly diversified goods and services. Obvi-
ously, increased competition from imports 
through a reduction in their prices, far from 
generating investment resources in the enter-
prises, reduces their surplus to the prejudice of 
accumulation. This competition thus generates 
unemployment and weakens accumulation. In 
contrast, when the unemployment is due to in-
creased productivity, this increase produces an 
accumulation potential which, if utilized, en-
ables the unemployment to be offset. 
This is the serious problem which is caus-
ing so much concern and which must be faced 
immediately if we are to find mutually advan-
tageous solutions. 
Clearly, it would suit the periphery much 
better to be able gradually to take advantage of 
the market of the centres without the need to re-
sort to an exaggerated reduction of prices at the 
expense of the fruits of their technical progress, 
which would not suit the centres either. Up to 
now, without referring to the exports of the lat-
ter, we can say that they have tried to defend 
themselves through arrangements such as the 
Multifibres Agreement and the so-called volun-
tary accords in order to limit exports from the 
periphery. As well as constituting discrimina-
tory actions —since they affect only the 
periphery and not the centres— these measures 
are not in line with the contractual system of 
GATT and are always subject to the threat of 
further unilateral decisions by the centres. Of 
course, fundamentally the principles of GATT 
are not applicable to these new tensions, which 
call for a new institutional system, as the 
UNCTAD Secretariat has suggested. 
It is necessary, then, to explore other av-
enues which suit both the interests of the centres 
and those of the periphery. New ways of recog-
nizing comparative advantages in practice are 
called for. There can be no doubt that it is in the 
interests of the periphery to gain access to the 
markets of the centres for goods which are in 
line with their technological capacity, so that 
they can import the other technologically ad-
vanced goods produced by the centres, which it 
would be very costly for them to substitute at the 
present stage of their technological develop-
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ment. This would also mean clear advantages 
for the centres, because of the ever wider field 
thus offered for the exploitation of their tech-
nological innovations. In other words, it would 
suit the centres to export goods with a high tech-
nological content in exchange for imports of 
goods with a lower technological content from 
the periphery, and this would also be advan-
tageous for the latter. 
Of course I am not proposing concrete 
formulas, but simply stressing the need to ex-
' plore them: what is needed is to reach for-
mulas which gradually and progressively open 
up the markets of the centres without the risks 
of unlimited competition. 
Clearly, the formulas needed are not static 
but eminently dynamic. Exports of manufac-
tures by the countries of the periphery, together 
with import substitution, will enable their indus-
trialization to be made increasingly efficient 
and, at the same time, promote their technologi-
cal development. It will therefore be under-
stood that this advance would make it possible to 
increase the exports of goods which are at 
present not technologically accessible to the 
periphery, as has already happened in the case 
of countries which, although once peripheral, 
have finally attained technological homogeneity 
and become integrated into trade with the 
centres. 
The peripheral countries which are ad-
vancing in their industrialization are passing 
through a transitional period which is more or 
less prolonged, in line with the big differences 
existing between them. If this process is con-
tinued in a decisive manner, there will be a 
steady expansion in actual fact, and not just in a 
formal manner, in the scope of the international 
division of labour within GATT and the mutu-
ally advantageous observance of its principles, 
including eventually that of reciprocity. 
The role of the centres will be of consider-
able importance during this transitional period: 
up to what point will they be able to open them-
selves up substantially to the periphery? In the 
light of what has been said before, there would 
appear to be serious doubts about this: there is 
nothing to indicate that, even in the best of 
cases, the periphery could dispatch to the 
centres all the exports it would need to make in 
order to acquire there the enormous amounts of 
goods required for its development. 
There is no justification for placing exag-
gerated emphasis on exports to the centres while 
failing to give sufficient importance to exports 
of manufactures within the periphery itself. 
The main obstacle continues to be the economic 
division of the periphery, which is a clear man-
ifestation of the way in which the centres, 
through the very dynamics of their own de-
velopment, have left the periphery on the 
sidelines of industrialization. 
6. The division ofthe periphery 
In the past system of the international division 
of labour, each peripheral country converged 
separately towards the centres, with very little 
intra-peripheral mutual trade. Import substitu-
tion used protection in a general manner, with-
out establishing preferences among the de-
veloping countries, since on top of the violation 
of conventional principles represented by pro-
tection in itself, such preferences would have 
added something which the centres would have 
rejected as open discrimination. Thus, import 
substitution was carried out in watertight com-
partments and not much progress has been 
made in the arrangements arrived at over the 
course of time in order to try to gradually do 
away with these compartments. 
One of the main reasons (although not the 
only one) why this division has lasted was the il-
lusion, during the long years of prosperity of 
the centres, that the indefinite expansion of ex-
ports of manufactures made it unnecessary to 
continue with an active import substitution pol-
icy combined with mutual exports within the 
periphery. Furthermore, the centres either ac-
tively opposed measures aimed at correcting the 
division of the periphery or, even in the best of 
circumstances, were indifferent to them and 
failed to give them the support which would 
have been of great significance in this respect. 
This was yet another of the consequences of the 
centripetal growth pattern which first of all set 
aside the periphery from industrialization and 
subsequently kept it on the sidelines of trade in 
industrial products. 
It is worth repeating once again that this 
centripetal growth pattern was a primary factor 
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in the centres' lack of any real interest in the de-
velopment of the periphery, except inasmuch as 
it is of importance to their own development. I 
refer to the development of the periphery in all 
its social depth, that is to say, the process 
whereby the advantages of technical progress 
are spread throughout the structure of society 
and are not limited to a relatively small part of 
the labour force. 
This assertion may seem surprising in view 
of the active role which the transnational corpo-
rations have played in the industrialization of 
the periphery in recent decades. At first, the 
centres opposed this development, but once the 
process was well under way and appeared to be 
irreversible, they stimulated the participation of 
these transnationals, which thus took advantage 
of import substitution after having previously 
opposed it. It was claimed that the transnation-
als would be agents of the internationalization 
of production, but their most important role has 
been to internationalize forms of consumption 
rather than those of production, since they have 
been an important factor in opening up the 
markets for the centres. In other words, without 
ignoring their technological contribution, the 
transnational corporations have nevertheless 
1. The recovery of the centres 
T h e consequences of the recession in the 
centres —which is tending to become an out-
right depression— are increasingly serious both 
in the centres themselves and in the rest of the 
world. We have already referred to the negative 
effects of monetary policy, which is largely re-
sponsible for this recession. The truth is, how-
ever, that inflation had been developing for 
some time past, and the rise in oil prices helped 
to intensify it. This is the structural phenome-
non which it was attempted to tackle with this 
taken advantage of the industrialization of the 
periphery without making any serious contribu-
tion towards offering it international horizons. 
Very important changes are taking place 
in the world economy. Thus, we are at present 
witnessing, among other events which cause 
profound concern, the decline of productivity 
in the centres. The increase in productivity 
seems to have ceased to be a process which oc-
curs automatically in the capitalist growth pat-
tern, It must now be the result of a deliberate 
policy, in both the domestic and the interna-
tional fields. It is therefore to be expected that 
new criteria should now be adopted in tackling 
the problem of relations with the periphery, in-
cluding the question of comparative trade ad-
vantages. This problem must be approached, 
however, not in the previous ways, but in re-
sponse to a situation which is very different 
from that which existed when the periphery 
began its industrialization. There is now no 
longer any doubt about its increasing capacity to 
achieve this, and it must therefore be allowed to 
participate in the sustained and growing process 
of comparative advantages, where it could make 
a notable contribution to increased productivity 
in the world economy. 
policy. But how are we to set about the recovery 
of economic activity now? 
T h e pressing need for recovery is acknowl-
edged in all circles, and perhaps the most im-
portant factor which is holding up the essential 
expansion of credit is the fear of a new wave of 
inflation. This fear, in view of the vicissitudes 
which have taken place in recent times, is indeed 
not without foundation. 
The fact is that some increase in prices 
would appear to be inevitable, in spite of the idle 
capacity of the economies. Indeed, it is neces-
sary to increase the amount of profits in order 
III 
The conjunctural effects of the crisis on the 
peripheral countries 
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for enterprises to have the incentive and re-
sources to increase their capital investment. 
Herein lies the risk of a new inflationary 
spiral, and the possibility of avoiding this risk 
depends fundamentally on the ability to moder-
ate the pressure of wages, especially when they 
have suffered some deterioration. There can be 
no doubt that if this pressure exceeds certain 
limits, the resulting rise in costs would lead to a 
rise in prices, and this An turn would bring about 
new demands for wage increases. 
T h e danger does not lie only in this, how-
ever. T h e recession has brought about or aggra-
vated a Fiscal deficit, and the reluctance to take 
corrective measures which would intensify the 
recession is therefore understandable. If these 
measures are not tallen, however, in proportion 
as the economy recovers there would at the 
same time be serious inflationary effects. 
On the other hand, simply leaving the situ-
ation unchanged without taking any recovery 
measures is an attitude which is not acceptable 
from any point of view either. We are therefore 
faced with an unavoidable dilemma. Today, as 
in other eras, the consequences of a restrictive 
monetary policy fall on the labour force. From 
the point of view of recovery, it is no longer pos-
sible to recreate the times when the growth in 
accumulation was achieved largely at the ex-
pense of the labour force. What can we do, then, 
to reconcile this need for accumulation with 
the very understandable aspirations of the 
labour force to share in the fruits of the recov-
ery? 
Everything indicates that it will be impossi-
ble to avoid a new surge of inflation unless we 
face up to three requirements: the need for 
equity in distribution, the need for accumula-
tion, and the need to correct the fiscal deficit as 
the recovery progresses. 
This is not the place, of course, to go more 
deeply into these aspects regarding the centres. 
It is necessary, however, to emphasize their 
structural nature. We must not forget the vul-
nerability of the process of accumulation of re-
productive capital as the struggle to share in the 
benefits progresses. We have not yet made suffi-
cient progress in the interpretation of these 
phenomena, without which we cannot hope to 
change this process. This does not mean, how-
ever, that we cannot take a few initial steps in 
the light of a more integrated concept of in-
comes policy. 
2. The recovery of the periphery and the 
external imbalance 
Let us now go on to examine the case of the 
peripheral countries in very general terms. 
These countries have to face u p to the conse-
quences of the slow growth of the centres in the 
present decade and their protectionist practices, 
the consequences of these factors being aggra-
vated by the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
What does this deterioration signify? Quite 
simply, the answer is that the periphery is hav-
ing to bear a substantial part of the heavy bur-
den of the economic and social cost of the reces-
sion. This is recognized in a recent report by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in which it is stated that 
one third or more of the cost of bringing down 
inflation in the centres has fallen on commodity 
prices.2 
These and other adverse consequences 
make it clear that the peripheral countries can-
not simply remain inactive, waiting for the 
centres to recover: they must set about organiz-
ing their own recovery policy, and this task will 
be all the more difficult the longer it is delayed. 
Despite the big differences between the 
countries of the periphery and their different 
levels of development, they have common prob-
lems of prime importance, without overlooking 
the special case of the oil-exporting countries. 
They suffer, above all, from an external im-
balance. How is this problem to be tackled? In 
order to eliminate the imbalance it is essential to 
reduce imports and other external payments as 
long as the adverse external circumstances make 
it impossible to secure any substantial increase 
in exports or to procure a net contribution of fi-
nancial resources from the exterior. There are 
2
". . .a third or more of the decline in the inflation 
may be attributed to the weakness of primary product 
prices, which could be expected to recover in the event of a 
pick-up of activity", OECD Economic Outlook No. 32, Paris, 17 
December 1982. 
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two ways of compressing imports, however: by 
bringing about a contraction in domestic activity 
until equilibrium is achieved, or by putting into 
practice a selective policy. The first of these ap-
proaches is in line with the conventional recom-
mendation against any intervention of the State 
in order to regulate imports, but the economic 
and social cost of such a so-called 'spontaneous 
readjustment of the economy in line with the 
market laws' can be enormous. In spite of the 
fact that recommendations of this nature often 
come from the loftiest spheres, even in the times 
we are living in, it is simply not acceptable to fol-
low this path towards the restoration of external 
equilibrium. It is therefore important to adopt a 
selective policy, and there is no reason to have 
any doctrinaire scruples in this respect when 
these stem from a mistaken and negative con-
cept. 
A selective import policy of a rational na-
ture should aim to reduce or eliminate non-es-
sential or unnecessary imports in order to use 
the countries' external payments capacity for 
those imports which are associated with 
economic activity and the well-being of the 
population. As the immediate objective of re-
storing equilibrium is achieved, there promptly 
arises another: to avoid a new imbalance 
brought about by the recovery policy itself. 
This policy must be based on the cautious 
expansion of credit to stimulate demand and 
the utilization of the idle capacity of the econ-
omy. It may be noted in passing that the very 
high interest rates currently prevailing are a se-
vere obstacle to the achievement of this objec-
tive. It is quite true that although a sharp reduc-
tion in them is advisable, this will stimulate the 
outflow of funds to the exterior, and this in turn 
could make it necessary to impose control mea-
sures which would also have to cover remittances 
of profits. At all events, moreover, no matter 
how prudent the reactivation policy is, it will 
bring with it an increased demand for imports 
beyond the countries' external payments capac-
ity. T h e selective policy must therefore be ap-
plied with sufficient vigour to prevent new im-
balances. This will by no means be an easy mat-
ter, especially in those countries —of which 
there are many— where margin for reducing 
imports has already been reduced to a relatively 
narrow one. 
3. Selectivity of imports and mutual trade 
This aspect constitutes one of the most signifi-
cant differences compared with the Great De-
pression of the 1930s. Then, as now, it was nec-
essary to adjust imports to the countries' exter-
nal payments capacity. Unfortunately, at that 
time the restrictive measures were applied not 
only to the imports from the centres, where the 
main source of the imbalance lay, but also to the 
relatively small imports from other developing 
countries. In this way, the pressure of cir-
cumstances caused the possibility of promoting 
mutual trade, especially at the regional level, to 
be thrown away. 
Nowadays, the situation is different, be-
cause this mutual trade has already developed 
and has great growth potential: it would there-
fore be extremely regrettable if the selective pol-
icy were to go astray once again. It will be no 
easy matter to avoid this, especially when the 
size of the imbalance is very substantial and 
there are also domestic considerations which 
might lead to such deviations from the right 
path. The need to promote the utilization of idle 
capacity and to increase employment, for exam-
ple, could lead to a decision to do without im-
ports from other peripheral countries, thus sac-
rificing the possibility of making exports in re-
turn. 
Unfortunately, we find ourselves once 
again without suitable machinery for balancing 
trade at the regional level (or subregional, as ap-
propriate) or beyond these levels. Little has 
been done in this respect, and we must there-
fore tackle new initiatives aimed at securing 
multilateral trade compensation. 
This is not just a question of compensation 
machinery, but also of recognizing certain re-
quirements for reciprocity, so that the more ad-
vanced countries, which take more advantage 
than the others of the trade in their respective 
areas, will have the responsibility for making or 
promoting investments in the weaker parts of 
the system, in order that the latter may also 
enjoy the advantages of reciprocity. 
The absence or inadequacy of such 
machinery could lead, in some cases, to bilateral 
arrangements, as in earlier times. This is of 
course a very makeshift approach, but it would 
be preferable to completely sacrificing mutual 
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trade: it is therefore quite acceptable, provided 
that the need to eventually arrive at multilateral 
forms of trade compensation is borne in mind. 
It may be recalled that the long years of 
prosperity of the centres not only discouraged 
import substitution on the basis of mutual trade, 
but also the development of machinery for such 
trade. 
In this case, as in others, conjunctural 
measures must seek to pave the way for longer-
term solutions. Thus, once the external imbal-
ances of a conjuctural nature have been over-
come, greater prominence will be assumed by 
the factors of structural imbalance to which so 
much significance has been attached in this 
study. The problem is how to overcome the 
structural tendency towards an external 
bottleneck. In view of the very slow rate of de-
velopment of the centres and their protectionist 
practices, it will be essential, especially at the re-
gional level, to tackle the substitution of imports 
of capital goods, intermediate goods and con-
sumer durables originating from the technolog-
ical innovations of the centres. 
The structural nature of this substitution 
should not make us lose sight of certain im-
mediate possibilities for contributing to the cor-
rection of the conjunctural imbalance by im-
porting some of these goods from other coun-
tries of the periphery. As usually happens, some 
immediate drawbacks will be encountered in 
this. A country which imports essential goods 
from other developing countries instead of 
doing so from the centres will frequently have to 
pay higher prices, and as long as there is no rec-
iprocity in the form of the export of other 
goods this will represent a drawback which 
could discourage similar operations. A country 
interested in making such exports within the 
periphery, however, could consider granting 
subsidies to bring their prices into line with 
those prevailing at the world level. This is a sug-
gestion which is worth examining with a view to 
the development of mutual trade. Of course the 
centres will continue to oppose export subsidies, 
but I do not believe that this should induce the 
countries of the periphery to refrain from using 
this means of promotion, provided it is applied 
in line with suitable rules. 
This remark applies equally, and perhaps 
even more so, to policies aimed at the substitu-
tion of essential goods, towards which develop-
ment policy should necessarily strive. This is not 
a question of conjunctural emergency measures, 
but of structural adjustments. Iri proportion as 
vigorous efforts are made to increase exports of 
manufactures, as well as those of primary com-
modities, it will be necessary to initiate without 
delay investment plans for these products. It is 
essential to do this in order to gradually over-
come the serious limitations imposed on de-
velopment by the slow growth of the centres and 
their protectionist practices. 
The reasons in favour of a policy of com-
pensation or integration in the production of es-
sential goods are well known. Instead of general 
formulas of scanty effectiveness, it is necessary 
to arrive at agreements between two or more 
countries for joint production and the promo-
tion of mutual trade. These individual arrange-
ments should of course be made within a gen-
eral framework of incentives covering subsidies, 
preferential duties and financing, in line with 
the real requirements. It is also necessary to con-
sider the desirability of multilateral compensa-
tion machinery, which, in this case, would have 
to be in keeping with structural requirements. 
As regards financing, financial co-opera-
tion from abroad will be essential, especially 
while the developing countries are trying to cor-
rect the external imbalance and are still suffer-
ing from the limitations of domestic resources. 
The World Bank, and also the IMF, have finally 
recognized the need to participate in operations 
aimed at correcting external imbalances of a 
structural nature. Their financing of these op-
erations, together with that provided by other 
bodies such as the regional banks, could make a 
very effective contribution to enable the private 
or public enterprises of our countries to take 
part in these joint production arrangements. 
Quite apart from its inherent importance, this 
financing will help to strengthen the bargaining 
power of such enterprises when there is a justifi-
cation for the participation of foreign interests 
in financing and in providing technology. 
It would be highly desirable for the centres 
to give their clear and explicit support to this 
policy of joint production and mutual trade 
among developing countries. Up to now they 
have been reluctant to do so because they have 
felt that this would unfavourably affect their ex-
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port opportunities, but this is a mistake, because 
ultimately the intensity of the substitution policy 
depends on the degree of receptiveness of the 
centres to exports from the periphery. As al-
ready noted elsewhere, the more receptive the 
centres are, the more limited the scope of the 
substitution policy will be. If this policy is car-
ried out on a rational basis, it could hardly in-
clude among its objectives that of reducing im-
ports below the payments capacity of a country, 
but will be aimed rather at changing the domes-
tic productive structure in the manner and to 
the extent needed to achieve a satisfactory rate 
of development. 
In this substitution policy, high priority 
must be given to the needs for the supply of en-
ergy, either through oil production or through 
the development, of other sources, and the 
stimulation of food production, without which 
the need to resort to imports from certain cen-
tral countries would eventually assume unman-
ageable proportions. 
So far, we have placed emphasis on sub-
stitution policy with respect to the centres, and 
this is indeed of prime importance. This in no 
way signifies, however, that other forms of inte-
grated substitution should be overlooked. It 
must be acknowledged that in this respect the 
actual facts have lagged behind aspirations. In 
brief: although the substitution on a combined 
basis of certain basic goods is absolutely essential 
in view of the tendency towards imbalance with 
the centres, the substitution of other goods, al-
though not so vital, is nevertheless extremely 
desirable from the point of view of the interna-
tional division of labour. The experience ac-
cumulated so far gives grounds for both positive 
and negative conclusions which must be borne 
in mind when designing new policies in this re-
spect. At all events, however, a rational order of 
priorities must be established. 
4. Recovery and inflation 
Let us now consider the possible inflationary 
consequences of a recovery policy. Here, obser-
vations similar to those made in the case of the 
centres are called for. After a short while, a 
structural imbalance will arise between the 
growth rate of consumption and the need to in-
crease the accumulation of reproductive capital 
in proportion as the idle capacity of the econ-
omy begins to be used up. 
When discussing consumption, it is neces-
sary to exercise caution regarding certain con-
clusions on the significance of the concept of 
austerity. Austerity to combat inflation may be 
economically and socially unacceptable. On the 
other hand, it is an essential element for con-
taining inflationary tendencies in a recovery 
policy. It is not a question of restricting the total 
amount of consumption: on the contrary, an in-
crease in consumption is indispensable for re-
covery. What is really called for is to change the 
social composition of consumption in the light 
of considerations of equity. While it is true that 
the rate of consumption of certain social groups 
must be limited in order to raise the rate of ac-
cumulation of reproductive capital, it is equally 
true that the greater accumulation will promote 
increased employment and hence increased 
consumption on the part of the social groups 
which are favoured in this way. 
The increase in consumption by the labour 
force will have positive effects on recovery, 
above all when wages have suffered serious de-
terioration. Past experience must always be 
borne in mind, however. In general terms, it is 
not possible to improve the standard of living 
through wage rises, which, by raising the cost of 
production, inevitably result in a rise in prices 
followed by new wage rises, thus bringing about 
an inflationary spiral. Expansion will naturally 
bring about some rise in prices, and if wages are 
then increased, the spiral will become uncon-
trollable. We must therefore frankly ask our-
selves a question which is usually left out of the 
reckoning. A rise in prices is essential in order to 
increase the profits of enterprises and hence 
their capacity for accumulation. The assertion 
of this need, however, does not mean that we 
should necessarily recognize the need to contain 
wage rises, either through a social compact or 
by authoritarian measures: this would mean 
making the social cost of the economic reactiva-
tion fall on the shoulders of the labour force. 
Consequendy, both equity in distribution and 
the need to avoid the inflationary spiral make it 
desirable to find suitable ways of allowing the 
labour force to share in the fruits of the recov-
ery in proportion as the financial gains of the 
enterprises increase, after taking account of the 
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accumulation requirements. We may also con-
ceive the possibility of the labour force par-
ticipating in the process of accumulation. This is 
not the place to go into details of the necessary 
machinery for this, but merely to stress this as-
pect of great importance. It could really be the 
forerunner of a policy of macroeconomic regu-
lation of the rate of consumption and the rate of 
accumulation. In other words, we see once again 
that conjunctural measures should never lose 
sight of long-term considerations but should 
link up with them in advance without going 
against their significance. 
5. Financial adjustments 
In some countries of the periphery, and espe-
cially those of Latin America, the burden of ex-
ternal indebtedness has seriously aggravated the 
external imbalance. The action taken by the 
IMF is holding off a dangerous stampede that 
would adversely affect the interests of all, but 
the emergency arrangements arrived at are far 
from having solved the fundamental problem. 
It is necessary to speak out very clearly in this re-
spect. It is inconceivable that the debtor coun-
tries should continue contracting more and 
more debts indefinitely in order to face up to 
the payments of interest, nor should they have 
to resort to extreme compression of their essen-
tial imports for the same purpose, to the serious 
prejudice of their domestic activity and their 
precarious employment situation. 
It would therefore appear to be a matter of 
elementary prudence and foresight to arrive at 
credit arrangements for suitably extending the 
payment of debt service and reduce interest 
rates, which continue to be high in spite of their 
recent reduction, although it is doubtful 
whether this can be maintained if there is a new 
bout of inflation in the centres. 
At the same time, it is worth recalling the 
opportunities which now exist for the creation 
of Special Drawing Rights. The present tight-
ness of international liquidity seems to clearly 
point to the need for such monetary relief. This 
would be the right moment to insist on a link be-
tween this and development finance. The di-
mensions of this operation must be determined, 
however, in line with the demands of world 
trade and not those of financing, since the latter 
would only be a by-product of the former. 
In addition to the above-mentioned ad-
justment operations, a net increase is needed in 
the transfer of financial resources from the ex-
terior, especially until such time as the centres 
once again attain a satisfactory growth rate, al-
though this is unlikely to be as high as that 
achieved in their time of prosperity. Be that as it 
may, the reproductive investment of such re-
sources would help the recovery of the centres 
too. Difficult though it may be in the present cir-
cumstances to comply with the recommenda-
tions made in this respect in the United Nations, 
it is reasonable to expect that at least a plan for 
the gradual attainment of this objective in the 
next years could be arrived at. 
As regards resources of a conjunctural na-
ture, it would appear that some degree of con-
sensus has been arrived at regarding the expan-
sion of the IMF quotas and also the transfer of 
resources from other sources, especially the big 
central banks. 
This would also be the right moment to 
change the conditions imposed by the IMF in 
the light of experience, with the technical collab-
oration of suitable experts from the developing 
countries. 
6. The Sixth Session of UNCTAD 
While progress is made in the consideration of 
the international monetary reform, in which the 
periphery should play an active role, the Sixth 
Session of UNCTAD (June 1983) offers a 
favourable opportunity for considering the re-
covery policy advocated in the present article. 
There is a good deal of pessimism about the 
possibility of progressing in the consideration of 
the New International Economic Order, but 
such pessimism should not hold up the debates. 
On the contrary, this recession (or depression) 
which affects both the centres and the 
peripheral and socialist countries should be a 
suitable setting for considering the urgent and 
pressing problem of world recovery. 
It is necessary to assert with the greatest 
vigour and confidence the genuine possibilities 
which exist for of initiating and promoting this 
process for the benefit of all. There is no doubt 
at all that the foundations for this are already in 
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being, but the stubborn persistence in sticking to 
conventional ideas and forms of action is 
smothering these possibilities. Ideas in this field 
have lagged behind the enormous scientific 
progress made in other disciplines: it is there-
fore necessary to make innovations also in 
economic matters too, since the present forms 
of action prejudice the entire world economy. 
Much of what was achieved after the Second 
World War is now crumbling. 
The time has come to launch new ideas 
and put forward new forms of action in line 
with the extraordinary consensus of interests 
demanding a recovery policy which must be 
begun ' without further anxiety-fraught delay! 
Our countries, together with the rest of the 
periphery, must make their voice heard: a voice 
which is increasingly powerful in the centres 
themselves. 
Only the recovery of the developed coun-
tries will make it possible to overcome protec-
tionism and the imminent risk that they too will 
become economically divided, with correspond-
ing aggravation of the conflicts. Such a recovery 
will also reduce the great obstacles impeding the 
recovery policies of the periphery, which has 
been so seriously affected by the protectionism 
1. The ideological crisis 
The impressive progress of technology has been 
accompanied by great changes in the structure 
of society and the power relations which take 
place within it. New and difficult problems have 
arisen, and the situation today is very different 
from that of yesterday, but there is something 
which has remained unchanged in all this: the 
ideologies followed and the forms of action de-
riving from them. They were effective in other 
phases of the development of society, when they 
were in keeping with the interests and aspira-
tions of the dominant social groups in both the 
centres and the countries of the periphery. 
Now, however, as well as having become ineffec-
of the centres. As the recovery of the latter 
progresses, it will be possible to avoid new mea-
sures standing in the way of imports from the 
periphery and to set off along the road towards 
structural liberalization measures. Progress in 
the recovery of the centres will also relieve the 
deterioration in the terms of trade of the 
peripheral countries. At the same time, financial 
co-operation will acquire great significance for 
both sides, since the greater external payments 
capacity of our countries and of the rest of the 
developing countries will make it possible to 
satisfy the huge import needs inherent in the re-
covery of the periphery (and its subsequent de-
velopment), and this could make a notable con-
tribution to the recovery of the centres them-
selves. 
All in all, it is evident that there is a clear 
network of mutual interests which should be 
emphasized at the Sixth Session of UNCTAD. 
As a result, it would be possible to arrive eventu-
ally at consideration of the new world economic 
order, which by its very nature presupposes 
great structural changes. Nevertheless, con-
junctural matters deserve high priority and 
should be dealt with first so as to open the way to 
large-scale structural measures. 
tive to deal with the new problems, they have ac-
tually become a negative factor because of the 
great damage which their application causes. 
Not only have there been changes in the 
internal power relations, but also in the world 
structure, where moreover different ideas and 
forms of action from those prevailing in the past 
are gaining ground. 
There is thus an ideological crisis which is 
further perturbing the crisis in real activities. As 
we said earlier in this article, we do not believe 
that we are witnessing the decline of capitalism, 
but this will become inevitable if we do not soon 
achieve a thoroughgoing renewal of conven-
tional ways of thinking and also ways of acting in 
response to events, with a view to encompassing 
IV 
The market laws and ideologies 
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certain rational objectives motivated by an ethi-
cal sense which cannot be absent from these new 
ways of thinking. 
2. The market and its structures 
In recent years there has once again been a ten-
dency to proclaim the great virtues of the mar-
ket laws, the 'magic of the market'. In the 
theories on which this concept is based there was 
indeed an underlying ethic, since it was held 
that if these laws were allowed to operate in an 
unrestricted manner, the system would tend to-
wards a state of equilibrium in which income 
distribution was equitable and there were 
neither centres nor periphery. One must not 
deny the importance of the play of the market 
laws, but no matter how effective they may be 
economically, they lack social and ecological ef-
fectiveness. 
Let us repeat once again: in reality, it is not 
just a question of the market, but of the struc-
tures which lie behind it and the great differ-
ences of power which stem from them. These 
considerations must no longer be left out of the 
reckoning if it is desired to understand the 
problems now facing us and clear the way to-
wards solving them. 
I fully acknowledge the great value of in-
dividual enterprise and the profit motive in 
economic activity, as well as in the promotion of 
technological innovations, but these are not 
enough to ensure the effectiveness of the mar-
ket laws. This is a matter of great importance, 
and if we do not clarify it we cannot correctly in-
terpret the present crisis of capitalism in the 
centres and the peripheral countries, as well as 
in the relations between them. 
Some final reflections are therefore called 
for in the light of what was said earlier in this ar-
ticle. In order to avoid errors of interpretation, 
I wish to reaffirm that I assign great importance 
to the market not only in the economic but also 
in the political sphere. What is the reason, then, 
for the great faults in its operation? 
3. The market laws and distribution 
In my view, the main origin of these faults lies in 
the appropriation of the fruits of technical 
progress. According to theories which continue 
to form the background for conventional think-
ing, the tendency is for the enterprises, guided 
by the profit motive, to distribute these fruits so-
cially through the play of competition, either 
through the reduction of prices or through in-
creased wages. 
Well, I maintain that this is not so, because 
these fruits are largely retained by the upper 
strata by virtue of their economic, technological 
and political power. Within the growth pattern 
of the system, this is necessary in order for the 
accumulation of capital to increase, and this cor-
responds to a certain stage in the evolution of 
capitalism, since the changes in the structure of 
society open the way to the possibility of sharing 
in these fruits by the labour force and the State. 
This possibility runsicounter to the power of ap-
propriation, and as time goes on, it leads the sys-
tem to an inflationary crisis. The accumulation 
process thus becomes increasingly vulnerable. 
According to conventional theory, this crisis is a 
consequence of the violation of the market laws 
by this power of sharing, but they conveniendy 
forget, of course, the power of appropriation. 
The system can operate quite smoothly as 
long as this power of appropriation prevails un-
challenged, that is to say, when the power of 
sharing does not exist or is very weak. When the 
latter power develops and gains force, however, 
a crisis arises because of the structural imbal-
ance between the rate of consumption and the 
rate of reproductive accumulation of the 
surplus, due to the inherent logic of the system. 
There is an obvious contradiction in all 
this, for while the power of sharing is rejected 
on the grounds that it violates the market laws, 
no criticism is levelled at the original violation of 
these laws represented by the power of appro-
priation. 
4. The equivocality of technology 
In the free play of the market laws, the profit 
motive has stimulated technological research 
and its application to production, as is perfectly 
fit and proper. At the same time, however, be-
cause of the equivocality of technology, this 
same incentive has brought with it the irrespon-
sible exploitation of non-renewable natural re-
sources. Thus, oil prices went down while at the 
same time there was a spurious increase in pro-
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ductivity. Such was the power of the dominant 
groups in the centres and the projection of their 
domination at the international level that this 
situation continued until, at a suitable historical 
moment, their power was offset by that of the 
producer countries and there was a rise in the 
price of this non-renewable resource with the 
consequent aggravation of inflation. 
But this was not all. The decline in prices 
brought about by the play of the market forces 
(not without some manipulation on the part of 
the transnational corporations) brought with it 
very important consequences as regards tech-
nological research, which paid little attention to 
other sources of energy or to the use of renew-
able natural resources. Furthermore, this situa-
tion led technological research towards the 
abuse of energy through the exaggerated diver-
sification of goods and services. 
5. The structural imbalance with the centres 
This imbalance is also observed in the relations 
of the periphery with the centres. Here again it 
is a question of power relations. In the past de-
velopment of capitalism, the fruits of technical 
progress were concentrated and multiplied in 
the centres and the periphery was left on the 
sidelines of industrialization in the international 
play of the market laws. It was when the 
periphery began to industrialize that the ten-
dency to the structural imbalance arose. The 
periphery tried to correct this first of all 
through import substitution and afterwards 
through the export of manufactures on the 
basis of the economic and technological power 
which it was acquiring. Weak though this power 
was, it began to have adverse effects on employ-
ment and to offset the process of accumulation. 
In other words, the market laws, which in other 
eras reflected the interests of the centres {in 
conjunction with the predominant groups of the 
periphery), are now causing problems for them. 
Their supremacy in the world, however, has en-
abled them to take unilateral measures to coun-
teract these laws. As a result, both the centres 
and the periphery are losing the comparative 
advantages of trade which the central countries 
had so insistently proclaimed when the 
periphery was still excluded from industrializa-
tion. 
How clearly all this shows the virtues of the 
market laws as regards the proper allocation of 
productive resources! 
The economic incentive, once it has passed 
certain limits, has thus caused the deterioration 
of the environment thanks to the play of the 
market laws: yet another spurious element in 
the increase in productivity. 
6. The role of industrialization 
One of the manifestations of the dominant 
power of the centres over the periphery has 
been the ideologies imposed. Though they were 
previously effective in promoting the economic 
(and also the political) interests of the centres, 
the market laws at the international level no 
longer serve their purpose as well as before, and 
the centres are gradually diverging from them. 
These ideologies also give rise to very seri-
ous contradictions. While the centres, because 
of the growth pattern inherent in their capitalist 
development, retained and continue to retain 
the fruits of their technical progress, the 
periphery has been forced, because of its struc-
tural lag, to transfer part of its increased pro-
ductivity to the centres. 
This is where the role of industrialization 
comes in. In spite of its great significance for the 
promotion of the development of the 
periphery, recent versions of the ideology of the 
free play of market forces, in an unexpected 
turnaround, have again rejected protection and 
advocate devaluation instead of it. If it follows 
this path, the periphery will once again be made 
to transfer to the exterior the fruits of the tech-
nical progress already achieved in its competi-
tive exports. 
Those in the centres who profess conven-
tional theories and denounce measures aimed at 
containing the decline in agricultural prices in 
the European Economic Community and the 
United States because of increased productivity 
are taking a perfectly coherent approach. The 
only trouble is that governments respect but do 
not follow their urgings! 
7. The indifference of the centres 
T h e technologies of mass communication and 
transport also have a profound cultural influ-
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ence on the periphery. They shorten distances 
and internationalize the awareness of develop-
ment and of cultural identity, but the centres 
never take any serious and continued action to 
end the peripheral nature of the periphery with 
the passage of time. They continue to be indif-
ferent to the final fate of its development. The 
periphery, for its part, has no power to over-
come the indifference of the centres, but it does 
I have power to cause problems. This is a con-
tradiction which can have serious consequences 
for the centres. The truth is that the latter do 
not have a long-term perspective of their rela-
tions with the periphery. 
The centres themselves will increasingly 
suffer on both the economic and political levels 
the absence of this long-term perspective. They 
did once have it when they had to tackle the re-
habilitation of Europe after the war. For the 
periphery, however, they have lacked such a 
perspective except when it came to advocating 
birth control, and even then this was not as an 
element of a great policy of international co-op-
eration, but rather by way of a substitute for 
this. 
During the long years of prosperity of the 
centres, they did not bother with the periphery 
either, which was always exposed to the eventual 
return of obsolete ideologies. Now, however, 
the crisis of development and change has ar-
rived at the centres themselves, and they too are 
victims of their own ideologies. 
Both the centres and the periphery must 
learn from the lessons of their own experience. 
It is possible that this crisis may have the virtue 
of breaking the outworn moulds within which it 
was sought to confine a system which must in-
evitably be changed if it is to recover and in-
crease its powerful growth potential. 
8. Differences and common denominators 
with the centres 
It is an interesting point that the vulnerability of 
the process of accumulation of reproductive 
capital, which is mainly responsible for this crisis 
of capitalism, is observed both in the centres and 
in the most advanced countries of the 
periphery, in spite of their considerable struc-
tural disparities. This is because there is a com-
mon denominator between these countries, 
namely, the tendency towards a structural imbal-
ance between the rates of the different forms of 
consumption and the rate of accumulation of 
reproductive capital. 
This common denominator conceals some 
fundamental differences, however. In the 
centres technological evolution constantly diver-
sifies the consumption of goods and services, 
under the impulse of the powerful impetus of 
the system. This is a reflection of technical prog-
ress which, on the one hand, increases produc-
tivity and, on the other, encourages the use of 
that productivity for the diversified multiplica-
tion of consumption. In the imitative capitalism 
of the periphery, in contrast, we allow ourselves 
to be seduced by these forms of consumption 
without having reached the accumulation capac-
ity needed to solve our grave problems of social 
inequity. 
This propensity to imitate those forms of 
consumption has always existed. The urge to 
copy them was especially strong, however, dur-
ing the long years of prosperity of the centres, 
when there was an increase not only in private 
consumption but also in social consumption as 
an integral part of the sharing process. In addi-
tion, of course, there was the imitation —very 
strong in some cases— of military consumption, 
which is a serious element in that structural im-
balance. 
Important countries of the periphery were 
precursors of the inflationary crisis of capital-
ism, and now, along with others, they are suffer-
ing the consequences of that same crisis of the 
centres and the extremely grave adverse effects 
of the policy with which it is sought, especially in 
the main dynamic centre, to check inflation. 
The consequences are equally grave for both 
the centres and the periphery. 
Those long years of prosperity dazzled 
many countries of the latter, and in addition to 
being seduced by the attractions of consump-
tion, they slackened or completly abandoned 
their substitution policy, which should have 
been combined with the export of manufactures 
and their efforts to promote mutual trade. The 
whole of the periphery, despite the great differ-
ences in its level of development, should pay 
great attention to this new and promising de-
velopment horizon. 
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Countries which have been the birthplace 
of great technological innovations with enor-
mous potential for increasing human well-being 
—limited at present to only a small part of the 
world's population— have not been capable of 
finding innovations in the theories of develop-
ment, and hence in its practice too. Perhaps this 
is because the prevailing interests promoted 
such technical innovations but seem to have 
dampened intellectual creation. It is not too 
bold, however, to think that the present crisis 
may encourage the birth of new ideas and also 
of new men capable of bringing these ideas to 
reality through political action. 
